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Blakely in Minnesota, Two Years Out:
Guidelines Sentencing Is Alive And Well
Richard S. Frase*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington1 has produced some
changes in sentencing law and practice in Minnesota, but after two years the basic
structure of the state’s pioneering sentencing guidelines system remains intact.
Blakely caused much initial concern and uncertainty, but the dire predictions2 of
catastrophic change or major retreat from progressive sentencing policy have not been
borne out. This article examines the ways in which critical policy choices made
before and after Blakely helped to preserve the most important features of the
Guidelines. Part I shows how the design, implementation, and pre-Blakely evolution
of the Guidelines served to limit Blakely’s impact. Parts II and III then tell the story
of successive responses to Blakely by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission,
appellate courts, the Legislature, and the Criminal Rules advisory committee.
II. PRE-BLAKELY EVENTS, CUSHIONING BLAKELY’S IMPACT
A. The Design of the Guidelines
In drafting the initial version of the Guidelines which became effective on May 1,
1980, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission made several critical policy
decisions which, a quarter century later, served to limit the number of sentencing
decisions subject to Blakely attack.3
The Commission’s proposed guidelines were prescriptive, not descriptive; the
Commission viewed guidelines drafting as an opportunity to develop and improve
sentencing policy rather than an occasion to codify past sentencing practices. One of
*

Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota.
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
2
Justice O’Connor opined that “over 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost” Blakely, 542
U.S. at 326 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Although I no longer take such a pessimistic view, I expressed
similar concerns shortly after Blakely was handed down, fearing that Blakely could have the perverse
effect of encouraging good state systems to go bad and bad systems to stay bad. See Kevin R. Reitz, The
New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1082, 1101 (2005).
3
For further discussion of the Commission’s critical early policy decisions and other significant
pre-Blakely events, see Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s Blast,
18 FED. SENT’G REP. 12 (2005). See generally DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1988).
1
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the Commission’s most important policy decisions was to reject “real-offense”
sentencing and develop guidelines with recommended sentences based almost entirely
on factors which were already elements of the defendant’s conviction offense(s) and
prior conviction(s). The nature of Minnesota’s criminal statutes at the time facilitated
this decision. The criminal code had been recodified in the early 1960s, and was still
relatively coherent and accepted by practitioners at the time the Commission began its
work in 1978. Thus, unlike the federal criminal code (which has been in serious need
of recodification for decades4) the Minnesota code provided a satisfactory basis for
classification and ranking of offenses under the Guidelines. The Commission needed
only to fine-tune certain statutory offense definitions, for instance, by dividing some
forgery and theft-related crimes into several sub-groups, based on dollar amounts
involved, using the dollar-loss modifiers found in the general theft statute.5
Another early policy choice which later served to lessen Blakely’s impact in
Minnesota was the Commission’s decision to discourage high departure rates. The
Commission believed that departure rates needed to be low not only to reduce
sentencing disparity but also to achieve the Commission’s goal of avoiding prison
overcrowding. The Commission sought to coordinate sentencing policy with
available correctional resources, but this requires accurate predictions of future
resource impacts which are difficult to make if departure rates are high. Accordingly,
the Commission set a high threshold for departures, stating that the recommended
Guideline sentence is presumed to be appropriate for all cases in that category, and
that judges must cite “substantial and compelling” circumstances to overcome the
presumption and impose a departure. The Commission’s illustrative list of departure
criteria were intended to describe exceptional, infrequently-occurring circumstances;
the list also reflected the Commission’s policy decisions to base sentencing on
conviction offenses, not alleged or “real” facts, and to prohibit departures for facts not
consistent with the conviction offense(s).
B. Interpretive Case Law
Early case law strongly supported the Commission’s key policy choices
described above and further limited Blakely’s impact. The Supreme Court ruled that
upward departures could not be based on contested offenses for which the defendant
had not been charged or for which charges had been dropped,6 nor on predictions of
4

See Richard S. Frase, The Warren Court’s Missed Opportunities in Substantive Criminal Law,
3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 75, 98 (2005) (by 1970 federal criminal law was described as a “hodge-podge” and
“chaos”).
5
MINN. STAT. § 609.52, subdiv. 3 (1980); Parent & Frase, supra note 3, at 13.
6
See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 329 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1983); State v. Brusven, 327 N.W.2d
591, 593 (Minn. 1982). The Court ruled that judges could not depart on the basis of alleged crimes to
which the defendant maintained his or her innocence, State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17, 19–20 (Minn.
1982), but could depart on the basis of uncharged offenses if the defendant admitted them on the record,
State v. Rott, 313 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Minn. 1981); State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1981).
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future dangerousness, a special need for deterrence, or the defendant’s need for
treatment available only in prison.7 On the other hand, in reviewing trial court
decisions refusing to depart, the Court’s standard of review was highly deferential,8
emphasizing the strong presumption in favor of imposing the recommended
Guidelines sentence and suggesting that, even where departure would be authorized,
trial judges have discretion not to depart.9
In one very important line of cases the Supreme Court recognized several new
bases for departure which had not been approved and may actually have been opposed
by the Commission; however, the Blakely impact of these cases was quite limited.
Under the Guidelines courts may depart as to the duration of the recommended prison
sentence and/or as to “disposition”—whether the prison term will be stayed or
executed. A downward or mitigated dispositional departure occurs when an offender
with a presumptive executed-prison sentence is given a stayed prison term and placed
on probation; an upward or aggravated dispositional departure occurs when an
offender with a presumptive stayed-prison sentence is given an executed prison term.
The Commission’s initial list of permissible departure grounds, as well as its
adoption of a “modified just deserts” model giving increased emphasis to retributive
punishment goals, implied that all departures should be based on a finding of
increased or decreased offender desert, but the Supreme Court soon recognized nondesert grounds for dispositional (but not durational) departures.10 Offenders who are
particularly amenable to probation and/or unamenable to prison may receive
downward dispositional departures; offenders who are particularly unamenable to
probation (e.g., because they have failed on probation in the past) can receive an
upward dispositional departure. In practice downward amenability departures are
quite common but upward, unamenable-to-probation departures (the ones now subject
to Blakely requirements) are rare, and are often agreed to by the defendant in return
for charging leniency and/or concurrent rather than consecutive sentencing.11
7
See, e.g., State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981) (dangerousness); State v.
Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 n.1 (Minn. 1983) (deterrence); State v. Barnes, 313 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn.
1981) (need for in-prison treatment).
8
State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (“[Although] we do not intend to entirely close
the door . . . it would be a rare case which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.”).
9
This discretion was later made explicit by language added to the Guidelines, in the
Commission’s initial response to Blakely. See infra text accompanying note 24.
10
For discussions of this line of cases, see Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota,
1978–2003, in 32 CRIME & JUST.: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 131, 155 (Michael Tonry ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Frase, Sentencing Guidelines]; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and
Practice, in 22 CRIME & JUST.: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 363, 399–403 (1997) [hereinafter Frase,
Sentencing Principles].
11
See Frase, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 10, at 173, 179, 184–85; Frase, Sentencing
Principles, supra note 10, at 402 n.21, 416. Similarly, in plea negotiations defendants sometimes agree
to an upward durational departure in order to limit the extent of the departure, or in exchange for a
downward dispositional departure and/or dismissal of other charges. See also infra text accompanying
note 17 (discussing Guidelines Commission data showing the infrequency of contested upward
departures that would raise Blakely issues).
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C. Post-Implementation Statutory and Guidelines Modifications
Political and sentencing policy developments in Minnesota in recent years,
driven by nearly continuous political and media attention to issues of crime and
sentencing,12 have both increased and decreased the number of cases raising potential
Apprendi-Blakely issues. Statutory drug penalties and recommended Guidelines
sentence durations began to rise in the mid-1980s, and from the late 1980s through
2002 penalties for violent and repeat offending were substantially increased.
Statutory and Guidelines penalties for rape were raised again in 2005 and 2006.13
Many of the statutory penalty enhancements are subject to Apprendi-Blakely
requirements. But other statutory enhancements, as well as most of the increases in
the severity of presumptive guidelines dispositions and durations, have been applied
to groups of offenders defined by conviction offense and prior record. Such
enhancements raise no Apprendi-Blakely issues, and increases in recommended
Guidelines severity provide a higher “starting point” which tends to reduce the need
for and frequency of upward durational departures.
III. INITIAL RESPONSES TO BLAKELY
A. The Guidelines Commission’s Reports and Recommendations
Shortly after the Blakely decision was handed down Minnesota Governor Tim
Pawlenty requested the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to study the impact of the
case in Minnesota and submit short-term and long-term recommendations. The
accomplishment of these tasks was greatly facilitated by the fact that the Commission
Director at the time, Barbara Tombs, had previously held a similar position on the
Kansas Sentencing Commission when that body addressed changes required by a
Kansas decision which anticipated Blakely by over three years.14 The Commission’s
August 6 and September 30, 2004 reports15 concluded that upward departures and
12

See generally Frase, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 10.
See 2006 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 551(West) (enacting minimum extended terms for certain sex
offenders); Omnibus Public Safety Bill of 2005, ch. 136, art. 2, §§ 20, 21, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
658, 658–59 (West) (enacting extended terms and mandatory life and life without parole sentences for
certain sex offenses); Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, Report to the Legislature 3, 17–21 (Jan.
2006) [hereinafter 2006 Report to the Legislature] (proposing, as directed by the 2005 legislation, a
separate grid for sex crimes which is designed to raise penalties for offenders not subject to the enhanced
statutory penalties summarized above).
14
State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001). The Kansas statutory changes made in response to
Gould are posted at http://www.ussc.gov/STATES/blakely/ (follow Kansas Statute Post hyperlink)
[hereinafter Kansas statutory changes].
15
Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, The Impact of Blakely v. Washington on Sentencing in
Minnesota: Long Term Recommendations (Sept. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Long Term Report]; Minn.
Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, The Impact of Blakely v. Washington on Sentencing in Minnesota:
13
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certain other decisions under the Minnesota Guidelines would be subject to Blakely
requirements, but that Blakely would have a limited and easily-managed impact on the
state’s sentencing system. Although Blakely itself involved an upward departure from
the recommended prison duration under the Washington guidelines, and Kansas courts
had previously rejected the extension of Apprendi to upward departures as to
disposition (prison, in lieu of the guidelines recommendation of probation), the
Commission assumed (correctly, as it turned out) that Minnesota courts would find
Blakely to be applicable to dispositional as well as durational departures.16 But the
Commission reported that only 358 (2.4 percent) of the 14,492 cases sentenced in
2003 involved contested upward dispositional and/or durational departures.17
The Commission’s proposed response to Blakely was a mixture of avoidance and
compliance18—it recommended Guidelines changes to further limit the number of
cases raising Blakely issues, and new procedures to comply with Blakely when
necessary. The Commission also concluded that only upward departures would be
affected, thereby assuming (again, correctly) that these decisions are “severable” from
other aspects of Guidelines sentencing.19
The Commission’s Blakely-avoidance strategies sought to insulate discretionary
(“permissive”) consecutive sentencing from Blakely and to reduce the number of
upward durational departures. The Commission provided a list of crimes eligible for
permissive consecutive20 sentencing, in lieu of the former rule requiring the court to
find that the crimes were “person” offenses.21 As for departures, the Commission
Short Term Recommendations (Aug. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Short Term Report].
16
Long Term Report, supra note 15, at 11. See infra text accompanying notes 27, 44 and 82
(discussing cases addressing whether upward durational and upward dispositional departures are subject
to Blakely).
17
Long Term Report, supra note 15, at 7–9. Of the 12,978 cases sentenced in 2002, 286 (2.2
percent) involved contested upward departures. Id. In 2002 and 2003 the total upward departure rates
were 7.7% and 7.3% respectively. 2006 Report to the Legislature, supra note 13, at 12. See also Minn.
Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, Sentencing Practices Annual Summary of Statistics for Felony
Offenders Sentenced in 2004 29 (Oct. 2005) (7% of offenders sentenced in 2004 had upward
dispositional and/or durational departures; plea agreements were involved in 35% of these cases); Minn.
Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, Sentencing Practices Annual Summary of Statistics for Felony
Offenders Sentenced in 2003 29 (Dec. 2004) (total upward departure rate of 7%, of which 37% involved
a plea agreement).
18
Cf. Reitz, supra note 2, at 1108–18 (discussing Blakely “approach” and “avoidance” strategies).
19
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of severability in State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d
131 (Minn. 2005). For further discussion of Shattuck, see infra text accompanying notes 27 and 44.
20
Consecutive sentences are either discouraged, presumptive, or permissive. MINN. SENTENCING.
GUIDELINES § II.F. (2006). Most multiple-count offenders fall into the first category—concurrent
sentencing is recommended and consecutive sentencing constitutes an upward departure (and thus is
subject to Blakely requirements). Sentences for crimes committed while in prison, on release, or on
escape status are presumptively consecutive to the existing sentence. Multiple crimes of violence and
certain other multiple crimes are subject to permissive consecutive sentencing—they may be sentenced
concurrently or consecutively, in the court’s discretion.
21
Long Term Report, supra note 15, at 18. See also Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n,
Report to the Legislature 6, 13–17 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Report to the Legislature]. But see State v.
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proposed to substantially broaden the cell ranges on the Guidelines grid, taking full
advantage of the enabling statute provision authorizing ranges as broad as 15 percent
above and below the midpoint.22
The Commission’s compliance recommendations were based on procedures
similar to those which had already been implemented in Kansas, to permit upward
departure under that state’s guidelines consistent with constitutional requirements; the
Commission’s proposed changes in pretrial and trial rules provided for jury trials of
sentence-enhancing facts unless such facts were admitted by the defendant or the
defendant requested the court to make the findings.23 The Commission also added
language to the Guidelines stating that sentencing outside of the guidelines range “is
an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by case law and appellate review,” and
that if aggravated facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt “the judge may exercise
the discretion to depart.”24 This language confirms that even where a jury has found
that aggravated circumstances are present the judge retains discretion not to depart, or
to depart by less than the full extent allowed.
B. Early Blakely Case Law
Most courts and practitioners in Minnesota never seriously doubted that at least
some sentencing decisions under the Minnesota Guidelines would be subject to
Blakely requirements. This was the conclusion reached by the Commission in its
August and September 2004 reports,25 and in decisions of the state’s intermediate
court of appeals during the first six months following Blakely.26
In December 2004 (one month before Booker), the Minnesota Supreme Court
issued its initial opinion in State v. Shattuck (Shattuck I),27 holding that the upward
durational departure in that case violated the defendant’s rights under Blakely. The
court requested supplemental briefing on the following issues: 1) severability of the
Senske, 692 N.W.2d 743, 746–49 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (declining to extend Blakely to permissive
consecutive sentencing invoked by a judicial finding that both crimes were “crimes against persons”).
22
2005 Report to the Legislature, supra note 21, at 6, 17–18. The Legislature further broadened
the cell ranges, see infra text accompanying note 36.
23
Long Term Report, supra note 15, at 12–19; Kansas statutory changes, supra note 14. See also
infra text accompanying notes 31–36 and 83–99, discussing procedures enacted by the Legislature and
proposed by the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee.
24
Report to the Legislature, supra note 21, at 11. But see infra text accompanying notes 45–46,
discussing a rare example of a mandated upward departure.
25
Short Term Report, supra note 15, at 1, 3–5; Long Term Report, supra note 15, at 3, 6–9.
26
See, e.g., State v. Saue, 688 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Fairbanks, 688
N.W.2d 333 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied, 2005 Minn. LEXIS 777(Minn. 2005); State v. Hanf, 687
N.W.2d 659 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Conger, 687 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Mitchell, 687 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Whitley, 682 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004).
27
State v. Shattuck (Shattuck I), 689 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 2004), modified on reh’g, 704 N.W.2d
131 (Minn. 2005).
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invalid upward departure procedures from the remainder of the Guidelines; 2) the
inherent authority of the Court to authorize the use of sentencing juries and a
bifurcated trial process; 3) double jeopardy problems with bifurcated trials; and 4) the
specific remedy to be applied in Shattuck’s case.28
Of course, if the invalid portions of the Guidelines were not severable the entire
Guidelines system would be invalid, and so would thousands of non-departure and
downward-departure felony sentences pronounced after Blakely (and even before,
given standard retroactivity rules).29 Courts and practitioners before and after
Shattuck I seemed to assume severability and, as noted previously, this was also the
conclusion reached by the Guidelines Commission. Thus, when the Court finally
issued its “full opinion” the following August (Shattuck II)30 it was no surprise that the
Court ruled in favor of severability. But the probable resolution of the other issues
deferred in Shattuck I was less clear, particularly the inherent authority of appellate
and trial courts to empanel sentencing juries and order bifurcated trials. As discussed
below, lower courts and the Legislature struggled with these and other issues in the
months following Shattuck I.
IV. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES
A. The Legislative Response
In May 2005 the Minnesota Legislature adopted the Commission’s proposals in
slightly modified form.31 The Commission had recommended that its proposed
pretrial and trial rule changes be considered by the Supreme Court’s Criminal Rules
Committee. Pending changes in the Rules to comply with Blakely,32 the Legislature
enacted the following interim rules which apply to all departures and sentencing or resentencing hearings on and after June 3, 2005, and which were supposed to expire on
February 1, 2007:33

28
Id. at 786. The Court’s subsequent opinion on substantive and remedy issues, issued in August
2005 [State v. Shattuck (Shattuck II), 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005)], is discussed infra notes 44–54.
29
Retroactivity is discussed infra text accompanying note 38.
30
704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005).
31
See Omnibus Public Safety Bill of 2005, ch. 136, art. 16, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 785,
785–90 (West).
32
The rules enabling statute authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of criminal
procedure that do not abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights, MINN. STAT. § 480.059(1) (2005).
The Supreme Court usually upholds inconsistent statutory provisions as a matter of comity, but
occasionally invalidates them. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 659 (Minn. 2001) (statute
excluding certain minors from attending trials unconstitutionally encroached on the judiciary and should
not be upheld as a matter of comity). See also infra text accompanying notes 92, 112–13.
33
Omnibus Public Safety Bill of 2005, ch. 136, art. 16, §§ 3–6, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 786,
786–87 (West) (amending MINN. STAT.§ 244.10). The 2007 sunset provision was later repealed. See
infra text accompanying notes 112–13.
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1. The prosecution must provide the court and the defendant “reasonable
notice” prior to sentencing of the intent to seek an upward departure
and the factors to be relied upon;34
2. A unitary jury trial (combined evidence-taking, final argument, and
deliberation on all issues) will be used unless a) bifurcated trial is
requested by the prosecutor, or b) some the evidence supporting an
upward departure is inadmissible on the elements of the charged
offense(s) and would result in unfair prejudice to the defendant;
3. In either a unitary or bifurcated trial the defendant may present evidence
and argument to the fact finder as to an upward durational35 departure,
but may only present evidence and argument supporting a mitigating
departure in the sentencing hearing, not during the trial;
4. Defendants may waive jury and request the court to determine whether
facts supporting an upward departure have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Legislature’s response to the Commission’s proposal to widen recommended
sentencing ranges went further, specifying that grid cell durations should extend 20
percent above the midpoint, not 15 percent.36 The result is substantially broader cell
ranges, especially for high-criminal-history offenders. For example, at offense
severity level IX (first degree criminal sexual conduct; first degree assault) the revised
cell width for zero-criminal-history offenders is 29 months (74 to 103); for criminal
histories of 6 or more, the revised level IX cell width is 54 months (135 to 189).
Previously, all cells at level IX had a width of ten months. These changes will allow
sentences to be enhanced substantially without exceeding the top of the cell range and
triggering Blakely rights. (The Legislature did not change the Commission’s proposal
to extend grid cell durations 15 percent below the midpoint, giving courts more
discretion to mitigate sentence duration without departing.)
Finally, the 2005 Legislature amended several statutory enhancement provisions
to authorize jury determinations of facts permitting upward durational departure
34

The legislation speaks only of departures on the prosecutor’s motion. Id. at §§ 3, 4. The
Commission’s report implied that courts could also initiate such departures unless this would violate
separation of powers. Long Term Report, supra note 15, at 15.
35
Other provisions in this legislation refer more broadly to “aggravated departure” or “aggravated
sentence,” thus covering both dispositional and durational departures (the difference is explained supra
text accompanying notes 9–10). The limitation to durational departures in this provisions appears to be
an oversight. For discussion of cases dealing with the application of Blakely to upward dispositional
departures, see infra text accompanying notes 81–84.
36
Omnibus Public Safety Bill of 2005, ch. 136, art. 16, § 1, 2005 Minn. Sess. Laws Serv. 785,
785–86 (West) (amending the Guidelines enabling statute, MINN. STAT. Sec. 244.09, subd. 5(2))(“The
guidelines shall provide for an increase of 20 percent and a decrease of 15 percent in the presumptive,
fixed sentence.”). See also http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Guidelines/grid05.doc (revised Guidelines grid,
eff. Aug. 1, 2005).
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(substituting “if the fact finder determines” for “if the court finds”).37 However, these
amendments apply only to crimes committed on and after August 1, 2005.
B. Case Law
Even before the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed in Shattuck I, supra, that
aspects of the Guidelines were subject to Blakely attack, lower courts had begun to
apply Blakely and resolve some of the many interpretative issues confronting courts
around the country. Accordingly, the following summary of Minnesota Blakely case
law is organized by issue, combining cases before and after Shattuck I. It begins with
the threshold issues of retroactivity, claim forfeiture, severability, and inherent judicial
power to craft Blakelyized trial procedures. The summary then examines various
rulings defining Blakely’s substantive scope and exceptions.
1. Retroactivity
In State v. Houston,38 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Blakely is a “new
rule” but not a “watershed” new rule; it therefore applies to all cases that were still
pending on direct review at the time Blakely was decided but does not apply to
defendants like Houston whose convictions had already become final.
2. Claim Forfeiture
Transitional cases like Shattuck raise difficult claim-forfeiture issues when the
“new rule” being retroactively applied had previously been clearly rejected by
controlling authority in the jurisdiction. Shattuck’s attorney had specifically objected
to the court’s finding of upward departure facts, arguing, as the Supreme Court
subsequently ruled in Blakely, that this procedure was in violation of Apprendi v. New
Jersey.39 But many defendants in cases decided before Blakely did not anticipate that
ruling and did not challenge their upward departures on Apprendi grounds
In State v. Osborne,40 a majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the
37

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.1095(2) (2005) (enhancement based on finding that violent repeat
offender is “a danger to public safety”). This statute had been found to violate Blakely in Fairbanks, 688
N.W.2d at 333. But some enhancement provisions were not changed, leading some courts to rule that
jury fact finding lacked a legal basis. See infra text accompanying note 54.
38
702 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2005). In a later case the court ruled that “pending on direct review”
includes cases in which the time to petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet expired,
even if the defendant never perfected his petition (preferring to request reopening of his direct appeal).
State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Minn. 2006).
39
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
40
715 N.W.2d 436, 441–46 (Minn. 2006). In an earlier case the Court reached the same
conclusion, rejecting the state’s forfeiture argument in a footnote without extended discussion. See State
v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 324 n.7 (Minn. 2005); see also State v. Henderson, 706 N.W.2d 758, 759–60
(Minn. 2005) (noting forfeiture doctrine but exercising Court’s discretion to consider a forfeited claim
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State’s argument that the defendant, whose direct appeal was pending when Blakely
was decided, had forfeited his Apprendi claim by failing to object in the trial court.
The majority recognized that most trial court errors, even those affecting
constitutional rights, are forfeited by failure to make timely objection, but the majority
declined to apply that rule in Osborne’s case. The majority reasoned that forfeiture is
essentially a form of waiver by silence; but waiver of important rights such as the
right to counsel and trial by jury requires an affirmative act, after advice of rights and
“searching questions” by the trial court, to ensure that the waiver is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.41 The majority also felt that applying the forfeiture rule in
Osborne’s case would be unfair and would not promote judicial economy; defendants
cannot be expected to raise arguments contrary to well-established precedent (prior
Minnesota cases had rejected Apprendi attacks on upward departures), and should not
be encouraged to do so.
Two concurring justices in Osborne agreed that the defendant should be allowed
to raise his Blakely claim, but preferred to base this conclusion on state criminal
procedure rules, which give appellate courts discretion to consider forfeited claims in
cases of “plain error . . . affecting substantial rights.”42 These justices further
concluded that the constitutional error in Osborne’s case (upward departure based on
judicial findings) “was plain [error] at the time of this appeal.”43
3. Remedies
In Shattuck II,44 the Minnesota Supreme Court re-affirmed and explained its
decision in Shattuck I, holding that Blakely applies to upward departures based on
judicial fact-finding. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the Minnesota
Guidelines are only advisory, and thus exempt from Blakely under United States v.
Booker.45 Shattuck’s case involved a repeat sex offender statute which mandated
upward departure to the statutory maximum once certain aggravating circumstances
were found, whereas most upward departures under the Guidelines are discretionary—
the sentencing court is authorized but not required to sentence above the presumptive

when required by “the interests of justice” and where there is no “unfair surprise” to any party); State v.
Fairbanks, 688 N.W.2d at 336–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (pre-Blakely waiver of jury trial and failure to
object on Apprendi grounds in trial court did not waive jury right under Blakely).
41
Osborne, 715 N.W.2d at 442–44.
42
Id. at 448 (citing MINN. R. CRIM. P. 31.02). These justices also cited federal plain error cases,
and noted that Rule 31.02 is substantially similar to, and based on the federal rule.
43
Id. at 452 (Special Concurrence of Justice Paul Anderson, joined by Justice G. Barry
Anderson). Chief Justice Russell Anderson joined the majority opinion, along with three other justices
not named Anderson; Justice Gildea took no part in the decision.
44
704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005).
45
Id. at 142; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“merits” opinion by
Justice Stevens); 543 U.S. at 259 (“remedy” opinion by Justice Breyer).
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range, when a legal basis for departure exists.46 However, the Minnesota Supreme
Court left little doubt that it considered such discretionary upward departures based on
judicially found facts to be equally invalid, under Blakely.47
The Court in Shattuck II also confirmed what most practitioners and lower courts
had already assumed—that the invalid departure provisions are severable from the
remainder of the Guidelines. The Court cited its earlier cases in favor of severability,
as well as a state statute48 calling for severability absent findings that this would not
effectuate legislative intent, and reasoned that the Legislature would have preferred
severability in this case if it had known that some provisions of the Guidelines would
be struck down.49 The Court also rejected the State’s argument that the Court should
follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead in Booker and make the Minnesota Guidelines
advisory, noting that Booker was decided on federal grounds and that Minnesota and
federal severability analysis are not the same.50
Finally, the Court in Shattuck II turned to the question of remedy in Mr.
Shattuck’s case—in particular, whether the Court had inherent authority to order the
trial court on remand to use a sentencing jury and/or a bifurcated trial procedure. The
Court concluded that it did have the authority to establish procedures necessary to
comply with federal constitutional requirements; but it declined to exercise that
authority, preferring in the first instance to leave to the Legislature the task of
deciding how to revise the Guidelines system in light of Apprendi and Blakely (and
noting that the Legislature had done so in the 2005 legislation).51 The Court noted
that because its “inherent authority extends only to its unique judicial functions,” it
would exercise that authority cautiously “in order to respect the equally unique
authority of the executive and legislative branches” in the exercise of their respective

46

See supra text accompanying notes 9, 24.
Shattuck II, 704 N.W.2d at 141–42. The Court also rejected the state’s argument that the
presumptive sentencing ranges in Minnesota were promulgated by the Guidelines Commission, and were
never formally adopted as statutes, unlike the Washington state guidelines ranges at issue in Blakely. The
Court noted that a similar argument had been rejected in Booker. Id. at 142; Booker, 543 U.S. at 237–39.
48
MINN. STAT. § 645.20 (2005).
49
Shattuck II, 704 N.W.2d at 143–46.
50
Id. at 146–47.
51
Id. at 147–48; see also supra text accompanying notes 31–37. The Court’s initial Shattuck II
opinion, issued on August 18th, remanded the case with directions to impose a sentence within the
presumptive range. But on October 6th the Court amended its earlier opinion, deleting mention of the
presumptive range and adding language, after the Court’s reference to the 2005 laws, stating that “we . . .
do not foreclose the district court from considering any constitutionally applicable and/or available laws
on remand.” Id. at 148 n.17. See also State v. Henderson, 706 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. 2005) (declining
to order a sentencing jury, bifurcated trial, or other specific procedures, but remanding “for resentencing
consistent with Shattuck II”).
Because the Court in Shattuck II chose to “express no opinion” about the sentencing jury and
bifurcated trial procedures adopted in the 2005 legislation, 704 N.W.2d at 148 n.17, it did not address the
double jeopardy issue it had previously identified in Shattuck I, 689 N.W.2d at 786.
47
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functions; 52 the Court further observed that the legislature has constitutional power
“to fix the limits of punishment,” while “the imposition of a sentence in a particular
case within those limits is a [constitutionally-recognized] judicial function.”53 Finally,
the Court stated that for it to “engraft sentencing-jury or bifurcated-trial requirements
onto the Sentencing Guidelines and sentencing statutes would require rewriting them,
something our severance jurisprudence does not permit.”54
Later in 2005, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a similar, cautious view of its
inherent remedy-crafting powers. In State v. Barker, 55 a case involving a dangerousweapon enhancement statute, the Court refused to order remand and re-sentencing
with Blakely-compliant procedures, citing Shattuck II. The state argued that
sentencing juries and bifurcated trials had received legislative endorsement in the
2005 legislation.56 However, the Court noted that the weapons statute itself had not
been amended and continued to provide that enhancement facts were to be determined
by the court, whereas several other enhancement statutes had been changed,
substituting “the fact finder” for “the court.”57 Accordingly, the court in Barker
remanded with directions to impose a sentence within the presumptive Guidelines
range.58
However, in light of the 2005 legislation the Supreme Court directed its advisory
committee to consider changes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure needed to
accommodate Blakely; the committee made its recommendations in March of 2006.59
A somewhat different remedy issue arises at the trial court level. Even if the
Supreme Court has declined, in the absence of legislative direction, to draft rules
governing all cases, or even to order particular procedures on remand in specific
cases, do trial courts have inherent authority to employ sentencing juries and
bifurcated trials, in an effort to retain upward departure power while complying with
Blakely? Prior to the 2005 legislation some trial courts in Minnesota were, in fact,
employing such procedures. In two cases these decisions were upheld on appeal, but
in several other cases different panels of the Minnesota Court of Appeals invalidated

52

Shattuck II, 704 N.W.2d at 147–48.
Id. at 148.
54
Id.
55
705 N.W.2d 768, 775–76 (Minn. 2005).
56
Id. at 776.
57
Id.
58
Id. But see State v. Moore, No. A05-1278, 2006 WL 2255726 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006)
(finding a violation under the same enhancement statute at issue in Shattuck but not precluding the trial
court on remand from imposing an enhanced sentence, presumably by empanelling a sentencing jury
pursuant to the 2005 laws) Neither the majority nor the dissent considered that Moore’s offense was
committed prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendment to this enhancement statute. See supra, text
accompanying note 37; see also infra, note 60, citing cases applying this limitation.
59
See infra text accompanying notes 92–104.
53
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such ad hoc procedures, citing the Supreme Court’s cautious remedy decisions in
Shattuck II and Barker as well as limiting language in the 2005 legislation.60
4. “The Fact of a Prior Conviction” (The Almendarez-Torres Exception)
A number of Minnesota appellate decisions have addressed the scope of the socalled Almendarez-Torres exception, recognized in Apprendi and carried over in
Blakely,61 excluding findings as to “the fact of a prior conviction” from jury trial and
reasonable doubt standards. In State v. Leake,62 the Supreme Court held that this
exception did not apply to the determination of whether a prior rape conviction was
for a “heinous crime.” The statutory definition of “heinous crime,” when applied to a
prior rape conviction, required the rape to have been committed “with force or
violence,”63 whereas defendant’s prior rape charge required proof of “force or
coercion.”64 The use of “or” in the rape statute meant that the jury might have found
coercion rather than force, and the Court appeared to assume that coercion does not
qualify as “violence;” thus, enhancement in Leake’s case required a separate finding

60

Compare State v. Lushenko, 714 N.W.2d 729, 733–36 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding trial
court’s use of bifurcated jury procedure despite absence of statutory authority, viewing Shattuck II as
addressed only to the Supreme Court’s issuance of general on-remand Blakely compliance procedures,
and not restricting the trial court’s inherent power) and State v. Chauvin, No. A05-726, 2005 WL
2979382 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2005), review granted 2006 Minn. LEXIS 19 (Minn. Jan 17, 2006)
(finding similarly as Lushenko) with State v. Greer, No. A05-552, 2006 WL 1704059 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 20, 2006) (The defendant’s crime was committed prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendments
to the enhancement statute, so the trial court lacked statutory authority to submit sentencing factors to the
jury); State v. Maddox, No. A05-339, 2006 WL 1460441 (Minn. Ct. App. May 30, 2006) (Trial courts
lacked statutory authority to order a bifurcated trial prior to the 2005 legislation substituting “fact finder”
for “the court” in this sentence-enhancement statute; in addition, the defendant’s crime was committed
prior to the August 1, 2005 effective date of that legislation); and State v. Hobbs, 713 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2006) (Prior to 2005 legislation trial courts lacked statutory authority to submit sentenceenhancement issues to the jury). See also State v. Moore, No. A05-1278, 2006 WL 2255726 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 8, 2006), dealing with sentencing on remand rather than procedures already employed by the
trial court, and appearing to approve the empanelling of a sentencing jury while disregarding the date-ofthe-offense limitation in the 2005 amendments to the enhancement statutes.
61
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 230 (1998). However, if a prior conviction is deemed to be a formal element of the charged
offense, then full-trial procedure standards applied even before Blakely. See, e.g., State v. Hinton, 702
N.W.2d 278, 281–82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the defendant’s prior convictions for domestic
violence were each “a necessary element of proving that his violation of the order for protection is a
felony-level offense” and finding that the defendant did not validly waive his right to a jury determination
of these prior convictions).
62
699 N.W.2d 312, 323–24 (Minn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 745 (2005).
63
See MINN. STAT. § 609.106, subdiv. 1(3).
64
Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 323–24 (explaining that a person could be convicted of rape under MINN.
STAT. § 609.344, subdiv. (1)(c) and not have committed a heinous crime under MINN. STAT. § 609.106,
subdiv. 1).
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that the rape in question was committed with force or violence, and the Court ruled
that this determination is subject to Blakely requirements.65
Similarly, in State v. Henderson,66 the Court viewed the Almendarez-Torres
exception as a narrow one and declined to apply it to the determination of whether an
offender with five prior felony convictions committed the current (sixth) felony “as
part of a pattern of criminal conduct.”67 Prior case law had defined the latter standard
to require that the current and prior crimes be similar in “motive, purpose, results,
participants, victims, or other shared characteristics.”68 The Supreme Court, quoting
language from an earlier Court of Appeals case, concluded that such a finding
“involves a comparison of different criminal acts, weighing the degree to which those
acts are sufficiently similar. . . . This determination goes beyond a mere determination
as to the fact, or number, of the offender's prior convictions.”69
But in State v. Brooks, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the AlmendarezTorres exception and upheld a three-month sentence enhancement based on the trial
court’s finding that the defendant’s criminal history score included a “custody status
point.”70 Under the Guidelines, a custody status point is assigned if the offender
commits the current offense while in custody or on probation or other supervised
release.71 The Court reasoned that custody status points, like prior convictions, are
established by the court’s own records, and assume that a person has one or more
convictions.72
5. Facts Triggering a Mandatory Minimum Term (The Harris Exception)
In Harris v. United States, 73 a case decided in the interim between Apprendi and
Blakely, the Supreme Court excluded from Apprendi’s coverage factual
determinations which invoke or raise the minimum sentence but do not change the
maximum. Although Harris was a 5–4 decision, and there is reason to believe that

65

Id.
706 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 2005).
67
Id. See also MINN. STAT. § 609.1095, subdiv. 4.
68
Henderson, 706 N.W.2d at 761 (quoting State v. Gorman, 546 N.W.2d 5, 9 (Minn. 1996)).
69
Henderson, 706 N.W.2d at 762 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 687 N.W.2d 393, 399–400 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2004)).
70
690 N.W.2d 160, 163–64 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), review granted (Mar.15, 2005), review denied
(Dec. 13, 2005). See also State v. Maurstad, 706 N.W.2d 545,551 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), review granted
(Feb. 22, 2006) (citing Brooks and holding custody status point determination not subject to Blakely).
71
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.2 (2006). In most cases the custody status point adds
one point to the defendant’s criminal history score, but a three-month add-on is applied when the
offender is already (i.e., without including the custody status point) in the far-right (most severe) column
of the guidelines grid. Id.
72
Brooks, 690 N.W.2d at 163–64.
73
536 U.S. 545, 547 (2002).
66
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Justice Breyer regrets his decision to join the majority,74 it remains the law.
Moreover, since Blakely merely extended Apprendi to the guidelines context, some
version of the Harris exception presumably applies to guidelines sentencingBthe
determination of a fact which raises the minimum but does not change the applicable
guidelines recommended maximum would be exempt from Blakely coverage. On the
other hand, facts which trigger a mandatory minimum that is higher than the
applicable guidelines maximum do raise Blakely issues, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court so held (without citing Harris) in State v. Barker.75
But in another case, State v. Leake, the Court distinguished and declined to
follow Harris.76 The defendant in Leake was found guilty at trial of first degree
murder, which in most cases carries a mandatory sentence of life in prison, with
eligibility for release after 30 years. But if the defendant has a prior conviction for a
“heinous crime,” the mandatory sentence is life without parole (LWOP). As
previously discussed, the Court ruled that the heinous-crime determination is not
within the Almendarez-Torres prior-record exception;77 however, the state also argued
that facts which invoke a LWOP sentence, in place of a life-with-parole sentence, fall
within the Harris exception. The Court had previously accepted this argument,
relying in part on Harris.78 But in Leake, the Court overruled its earlier decision,
concluding that, in light of Blakely, the LWOP-invoking facts at issue here “affect[]
the statutory maximum . . . Based on the jury verdict alone, the ‘statutory maximum’
sentence . . . is life with the possibility of release” (emphasis in original).79
Clearly, a sentence of LWOP is Amore severe@ than a sentence to life with parole,
but the maximum (i.e., the longest) sentence the defendant could end up serving is the
same—life in prison. The Court thus appeared to view “the maximum sentence” after
Blakely as meaning “the most severe sentence the judge can impose” without finding
additional facts, rather than the “longest-possible” sentence the defendant will serve
without such a finding. This is a broad reading of Blakely, particularly considering
that Leake, unlike Blakely, was not even a guidelines caseBin Minnesota, first degree
murder cases and life sentences are not subject to the Guidelines. Under the Court’s
reading, it would seem that Blakely overruled Harris. A narrower rationale for the
Court’s holding in Leake would be that LWOP is constitutionally different from life

74

See Reitz, supra note 2, at 1097.
705 N.W.2d 768, 771–73 (Minn. 2005) (36-month mandatory minimum sentence, based on
trial court’s finding of gun possession and that such possession “increased the risk of violence,” violated
Blakely; although the dangerous-weapon enhancement statute does not refer to the Guidelines or
expressly authorize upward departure, application of the statute in Barker’s case produced an upward
departure from the presumptive Guidelines sentence of 12 months (a year and day) with execution of
sentence stayed).
76
699 N.W.2d 312, 322–23 (Minn.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 745 (2005).
77
See supra text accompanying note 61.
78
State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 33 (Minn. 2003).
79
Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 323.
75
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with parole for Apprendi-Blakely purposes, just as these sentences are different for
purposes of constitutional proportionality limits under the Eighth Amendment.80
6. Dispositional Departures
As noted previously, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s LongTerm Report assumed that Blakely would be extended to cover dispositional as well as
durational departures, and the Minnesota Supreme Court so held in State v. Allen.81
Although the facts in Blakely only involved an upward durational departure, the court
in Allen quoted language in Blakely stating that the “maximum” sentence for Apprendi
purposes is “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant” 82 (i.e., without finding
additional facts). The court therefore invalidated the upward dispositional departure
and prison sentence which had been based on the trial court’s finding that defendant
Allen was unamenable to probation.
Although the Allen court did not cite its previous opinion in Leake, supra, both
cases seem to be based on a theory that the defendant- or jury-authorized “maximum
sentence” after Blakely means the “most severe” sentence (in a broad sense) that the
trial judge can impose without finding additional facts, as opposed to the most severe
sentence the defendant could end up serving. The latter (narrower) reading of Blakely
would have caused the court to rule the other way in these two cases—finding, in
Leake, that the LWOP-triggering fact is not subject to Blakely because, even without
LWOP, the parole board could refuse to ever grant parole; and finding, in Allen, that
the upward-dispositional-departure-triggering fact is not subject to Blakely because,
even without the departure, the presumptive stayed-prison sentence for the offense to
which Mr. Allen pled guilty authorized later revocation and execution of that prison
sentence. In both cases the alternative, “less severe” sentence available to the trial
court without enhancement can become more severe based on adverse findings made
in later proceedings. But parole-denial and probation-revocation decisions have never
been covered by jury trial and reasonable doubt standards, and it appears unlikely that
Blakely will be extended that far; at least in the absence of legally-binding rules, such
highly discretionary “correctional” decisions are akin to traditional indeterminate
sentencing (or advisory guidelines, under Booker II).
Allen overruled several earlier decisions of the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
holding that Blakely did not apply to upward dispositional departures. In State v

80
Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (finding LWOP sentence given to recidivist
property offender violated Eighth Amendment), with Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding
sentence of life with possibility of parole for recidivist property offender). These and other Eighth
Amendment cases are discussed in Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and
the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative To What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005).
81
706 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn. 2005).
82
Id. at 45 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303).
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Hanf,83 the court reasoned that dispositional departures are based on offender
characteristics, which makes these decisions unlike the aggravated offense factors at
issue in Apprendi and Blakely and more akin to Blakely-exempt indeterminate
sentencing (and/or more akin to prior record, which relates only to punishment and
which is also exempt from Apprendi-Blakely requirements). The court also noted that
modern juries have not been involved in choosing sentence dispositions. The Court of
Appeals may have further assumed that while jurors are equipped to distinguish
atypical offense conduct and to determine whether such conduct should increase the
deserved sentence duration, they would have difficulty assessing atypical offender
characteristics and matching them with the appropriate sentence disposition.
Exclusion of upward dispositional departures also serves to insulate probation
revocations from Blakely, although as noted above, there are historical and Blakelybased grounds for declining to extend Blakely that far. The Guidelines Commission
nevertheless has expressed concern about whether Blakely might cover revocation
decisions,84 but this issue has not yet been addressed in appellate decisions.
7. Other Issues
The Court in Blakely stated that its ruling does not apply to sentence
enhancements based on facts “reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.”85 Several Minnesota cases have considered what kinds of facts are
included in these two exceptions. In State v. Osborne,86 the Minnesota Supreme Court
examined the elements and jury instructions underlying the multiple counts of drug
crime for which the jury returned guilty verdicts, and concluded that the trial court’s
grounds for upward departure—crime committed by three or more persons who all
actively participate, and “major controlled substance offense”87—were not implicit or
inferable from the jury’s verdicts.
Similarly, the exception for facts “admitted by the defendant” has been narrowly
83
687 N.W.2d 659, 661–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). See also State v. Saue, 688 N.W.2d 337,
345–46 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). In State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 846–50 (Kan. 2002), the Kansas Supreme
Court held, on somewhat different grounds, that upward dispositional departures are not subject to
Apprendi (and now, Blakely) requirements. For an argument in favor of distinguishing between offense
and offender factors, under Blakely, see Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G.
REP. 89 (2004).
84
See Long Term Report, supra note 15, at 7.
85
Blakely, 542 US. at 303.
86
State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 447 (Minn. 2006).
87
The Guidelines definition of a major controlled substance offense requires that at least two of
numerous listed factors be present, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, Sec. II.D.2.b.(5). In Osborne the
trial court cited the following factors: “at least three separate transactions,” “manufacture . . . for use by
others,” “sale . . . in quantities substantially larger than for personal use,” “high position in the drug
distribution hierarchy,” “high degree of sophistication,” “offense . . . occurred over a lengthy period of
time,” and use of defendant’s “position or status to facilitate the commission of the offense, including
positions of trust [or] confidence.” State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d at 440.
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construed. In State v. Dettman,88 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
defendant’s admissions to the police and at a guilty plea hearing did not comply with
Blakely because these admissions were not accompanied by advice of the right to a
sentencing jury determination of the admitted facts and other procedural safeguards
necessary to establish an express, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the
jury right. The Court, citing Apprendi, viewed the sentence-enhancement fact in this
case (“deliberate cruelty” to the victim, a recognized basis for upward departure under
the Guidelines) as the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,” and
thus concluded that strict waiver standards must be applied.89
However, defendant-admission standards applied in the context of evaluating the
nature of a prior conviction are looser. In State v. Leake,90 the Minnesota Supreme
Court found that the element of “force” required to make a prior rape conviction a
“heinous crime” was established by defendant’s admissions made at the plea hearing
in the earlier case. The Court cited language in Shepard v. United States,91 stating that
the prior record exception of Almendarez-Torres, permits courts to determine the
nature of a prior conviction by examination of the “transcript of plea colloquy.”
C. Criminal Rules Changes and Additional Legislative Developments
1. Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure
After the Legislature took the lead by enacting interim Blakely compliance
procedures, the Minnesota Supreme Court directed its advisory committee to consider
necessary changes in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The committee issued its
report and recommendations in March 2006, and in August the Supreme Court issued
an order adopting the committee’s recommendations.92 The report notes the 2005
88
719 N.W. 2d 694, 652–655 (Minn. 2006). See also State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 774
(Minn. 2005)(holding that the defendant’s admissions at his sentencing hearing, after denial of his request
for jury determination of those facts, could not be counted as admissions for Blakely purposes); State v.
Senske, 692 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that defendant’s statements at his
sentencing hearing did not establish a valid waiver of his jury rights under Blakely); State v. Hagen, 690
N.W.2d 155, 158–60 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding similarly as Senske). See also infra notes 105–08
and accompanying text (discussing warning and waiver procedures in Blakely amendments to the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure).
89
Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 651, (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19). The court noted the
lower standards applied in State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 2005), but distinguished that case on
two grounds: 1) Leake’s prior admissions were part of a valid guilty plea; and 2) “Leake involved
Blakely’s prior record exception ‘which appears to incorporate its own admission exception’.” Dettman
at 653–54 (quoting Barker, 705 N.W.2d. at 774 (Minn. 2005)).
90
699 N.W.2d 312, 324–25 (Minn.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 745 (2005).
91
544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). The Court also cited several federal court of appeals decisions finding
admissions in guilty plea colloquies and plea agreements (in the same, not a prior case) to fall within the
Blakely admissions exception. Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 325. See also Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224
(1998).
92
Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Report with
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interim legislation but also states: “This is a procedural matter that is within the
province of the court, and it is appropriate that procedural rules governing this matter
be included in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.”93 Although the introduction to the
report and some of the proposed new Rules commentary imply that the proposals are
only in response to Blakely and the upward departure issues addressed in Shattuck I
and II, the actual rule changes are broader, governing any “aggravated sentence.” The
definition of that term in new Rule 1.04(d) includes not only upward durational and
dispositional departures but also any “statutory sentence enhancement.” The
following is a summary of the most important issues addressed by the committee.
Required notice. The prosecution is required to give advance notice of intent to
seek an aggravated sentence, and state the “grounds or statutes relied upon and a
summary statement of the factual basis,” at least seven days before the Omnibus
Hearing (where most pretrial motions are made); later notice is permitted in the
discretion of the court for “good cause” and “upon such conditions as will not unfairly
prejudice the defendant.”94 There was disagreement within the committee as to the
timing of such notice. All agreed that it should be no later than “the point where plea
negotiations are likely to occur;” the minority view was that notice need only be given
at least 14 days before trial, with the possibility of later notice subject only to the
prejudice standard.95 There was agreement on the committee that if later cases find
enhancement-triggering facts to be “functionally equivalent to elements of the
offense,” then notice would have to be given much earlier, in the formal charging
document (complaint or indictment).96
Pretrial discovery rules. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require
substantial pretrial disclosure to the defense of the prosecution’s trial evidence.
Accordingly, the committee recommended that, in addition to the “summary statement
of factual basis” in the required notice discussed above, the prosecution’s pretrial
disclosures should include “all evidence not otherwise disclosed upon which the
prosecution intends to rely in seeking an aggravated sentence,” with a continuing duty
to disclose any later-acquired enhancement evidence to be relied upon.97
Preliminary hearing on enhancement issues. At the omnibus pretrial hearing the
defense can argue that the proposed grounds are not legally adequate to support
enhancement, and/or that the proffered evidence is insufficient.98 This hearing will
Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure C1-84-2137(Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Rules
Advisory Committee Report]. The Court held a hearing on May 23, 2006 and issued its order, adopting
the proposed changes, on August 17, 2006, to take effect as of October 1, 2006.
93
Id. at 1.
94
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 7.03, 19.04, subdiv. 6 (eff. Oct. 1, 2006).
95
Rules Advisory Committee Report, supra note 92, at 3.
96
Id. at 2–3.
97
Id. at 5. See also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01 subdiv. 1(7), 9.03, subdiv. 2 (eff. Oct. 1, 2006).
98
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11.04 (eff. Oct. 1, 2006). The Comments to this rule indicate that at these
hearings the defense could also raise objections as to the timeliness of the prosecution’s notice of intent
to seek enhancement.
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also determine which of the trial options discussed below will be used.
Trial options. The Committee defined three jury trial staging options: 1) a fully
unitary trial; 2) a fully bifurcated trial; and 3) a unitary trial as to evidence-taking,
with bifurcated argument and deliberation on guilt and enhancement issues B in the
event of a guilty verdict there would then be arguments and jury deliberation on
enhancement.99 The factors determining the choice among these three types are: a)
whether the enhancement evidence is otherwise admissible in the guilt phase, and b)
the prejudicial impact of such evidence. A bifurcated trial should be held if the
evidence, or some of it, would be inadmissible in the guilt phase, or if such evidence
is unfairly prejudicial on the issue of guilt. The third, unitary-bifurcated option is
deemed appropriate when a fully unitary trial would put the defense in the awkward
position of having to argue against guilt and, in the alternative, against enhancement
assuming the defendant is guilty.100 Whichever trial option is used, the determination
of enhancement facts will be submitted to juries by special interrogatories.101
Applicable procedural rights and waiver standards in enhancement trials. The
proposal appears to assume that some additional trial rights, besides jury and
reasonable doubt, will apply in enhancement trials. Based on the proposed rights
advisory and waiver procedures for receiving the defendant’s admissions of
enhancement facts,102 the following trial rights apply: confrontation, compulsory
process, the Fifth Amendment Privilege, and the right not to have the court or
prosecutor comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. The committee left the
applicability and scope of other trial rights to be resolved through case law.103
Waiver options. The proposed advice-of-rights and waiver procedures
contemplate three waiver/admission options for a given enhancement fact.104 The
defendant may: 1) admit the fact and its legal sufficiency;105 2) waive jury and request
the court to determine the existence and sufficiency of that fact;106 or 3) waive jury
and stipulate the existence of the fact, but request the court to determine its
sufficiency.107 The committee comments also state that the defendant may waive the
right to jury trial for purposes of guilt determination but still demand a jury on the
enhancement issue(s).108 Presumably, that rule applies regardless of whether the
99
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defendant pled guilty or had a court trial on the issue of guilt; defendants would also
seem entitled to the option of demanding a court trial as to enhancement, regardless of
the method by which guilt was determined (by plea, court trial, or jury trial).
2. 2006 Legislation
In May 2006 the Legislature amended its 2005 legislation to clarify several
points. First, the Legislature expanded its interim Blakely compliance procedures so
that they expressly apply not only to upward departures under the Guidelines, but also
to “the state’s request for an aggravated sentence under any sentencing enhancement
statute or the state’s request for a mandatory minimum under section 609.11” (the
dangerous weapon statute).109 Second, the problem with the language of the
dangerous weapon statute, which prevented remand for a sentencing jury in State v.
Barker,110 was fixed by specifying that the “fact finder” (not “the court”) would make
any additional findings required for enhancement under that statute.111 However, the
2006 legislation may have complicated rather than clarified some issues by removing
the February 1, 2007 sunset provisions in the 2005 legislation creating interim
bifurcated trial procedures.112 The statutory and Rules provisions conflict in several
areas, and it is not clear which version will control.113 For example, the statute
requires only “reasonable notice” of the prosecutor’s intent to seek an enhanced
sentence, whereas the Rules specify notice seven days before the Omnibus hearing,
absent good cause and a showing of no prejudice to the defendant. And standards for
bifurcation are more defense-friendly under the Rules than in the 2005 legislation; the
latter provides that bifurcated trial will be held only if some enhancement evidence
would be inadmissible as to guilt and would cause unfair prejudice in an unitary trial,
whereas the Rules use a disjunctive standard—bifurcation is required if the evidence
is inadmissible or prejudicial.
V. CONCLUSION
At the two year mark, Blakely’s impact on Minnesota sentencing law and
practice appears to be modest and manageable. The number of cases in which Blakely
rights might apply is limited due to the design of the Guidelines, pre-Blakely
interpretative case law, and decisions of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and
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the Legislature, both before and after Blakely, increasing or broadening sentencing
ranges so that fewer upward departures are needed.114
Where Blakely applies, courts and practitioners have not found it difficult to
comply—using procedures recommended by the Commission three months after
Blakely (based on the approach already being used in Kansas),115 statutory interim
procedures adopted the following spring, and a steady stream of Minnesota appellate
case law interpreting Blakely and the ad hoc procedures initially crafted by trial
courts. The more detailed compliance procedures proposed by the Criminal Rules
advisory committee should resolve many of the uncertainties in Blakely’s scope and
logistics, and ensure that statutory and Guidelines enhancements will continue to be
available when deemed necessary.
Minnesota was the first jurisdiction to implement sentencing guidelines written
and monitored by a permanent sentencing commission, and its positive experience
with guidelines sentencing has guided and helped to inspire the adoption of similar
sentencing reforms in other states.116 Many of those states made similar policy
decisions that limit the number of cases raising Blakely issues—in particular, the
decision to reject “real offense” sentencing, basing recommended sentences and
departure grounds on conviction offenses, and the decision to keep guidelines rules
fairly simple to apply. The very different approach taken by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission not only made the federal guidelines more severe and more
controversial, but also would (in the absence of the Booker II remedy) have made
Blakely compliance much more difficult—many more determinations would have had
to be made by juries, and under the guidelines as currently written those
determinations would often be highly complex.
For states considering the adoption of sentencing guidelines, or the modification
of existing guidelines, Minnesota’s experience continues to be instructive. That
experience shows that, post-Blakely, guidelines need not be purely advisory.
Minnesota’s smooth transition demonstrates that a legally-binding guidelines system
can accommodate the Blakely challenge, provided those guidelines are well-designed,
well-supported by interpretative case law and sentencing statutes, and carefully
monitored by a respected and properly financed guidelines commission.
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